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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Dean Hall appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdict
finding him guilty of second degree murder and of using a firearm in the commission
of the murder. On appeal, Hall argues the trial court erred in declining to give his
proposed instruction on justifiable homicide. He also argues, for the first time on
appeal, that the trial court committed fundamental error when, consistent with Hall's
request at trial, it instructed the jury on the law of self-defense.

Finally, he

challenges two of the court's evidentiary rulings.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 11, 2011, Robert Hall shot Emmett Corrigan twice - once in the
heart and once in the forehead - killing him. (R., pp.1539-40; Tr., 1 Vol. 2, p.1772,
Ls.1-6, p.1776, L.17 - p.1779, L.16, p.1787, L.13 - p.1788, L.8, p.1789, L.7 p.1790, L.22; State's Exhibits 121, 122.) Emmett was a young attorney, a husband
and a father of five.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.913, Ls.1-7, p.1234, Ls.21-25, p.1253, L.23 -

p.1254, L.4, p.1255, Ls.9-14.) Hall's wife, Kandi, was Emmett's paralegal and had
been having an extramarital affair with him since September 2010.

(Tr., Vol. 1,

p.831, L.17 - p.832, L.1, p.833, Ls.2-23.)
In the months leading up to the homicide, Hall strongly suspected that
Emmett and Kandi were having an affair and he conveyed those suspicions to
numerous friends, acquaintances and coworkers. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.983, L.19 - p.985,
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Unless otherwise indicated, the transcript citations herein refer to the transcripts
that contain the trial and sentencing proceedings.
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L.14, p.1020, L.12 - p.1023, L.23, p.1024, Ls.19-24, p.1027, L.15 - p.1028, L.15,
p.1054, L.21 - p.1055, L.3, p.1064, L.2 - p.1066, L.7, p.1227, L.2 - p.1231, L.9,
p.1327, L.15 - p.1330, L.10; State's Exhibits 46.)

Hall was distraught over the

deterioration of his marital relationship, was jealous of Emmett, and told others he
"want[ed] his old Kandi back." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1020, L.12 - p.1032, L.16, p.1054, L.3
- p.1056, L.9, p.1162, L.13 - p.1164, L.14, p.1341, L.16 - p.1343, L.3.) Although
he never sent it, he wrote a letter to Emmett's wife telling her about Emmett's and
Kandi's affair and characterizing his life at that point as a "nightmare."

(State's

Exhibits 81, 81A; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.983, L.24 - p.984, L.5.) He also sent Kandi
a number of emotionally charged text messages and emails, ranging in content from
expressing his abiding love for her to wishing her "[g]ood luck with [E]mmett" and
warning, "Karma is a bitch and I will have the last laugh." (State's Exhibits 52A,
528B-5211; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.984, L.6 - p.985, L.17.)
People who observed Hall's interactions with Kandi described Hall as
controlling, possessive and emotionally abusive. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1238, L.3 - p.1240,
L.1, p.1299, L.2 - p.1302, L.16, p.1303, L.22 - p.1304, L.23, p.1353, Ls.3-7.) On
more than one occasion, Kandi's coworkers heard Hall yell at Kandi and call her
derogatory names. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1238, L.21 - p.1240, L.1, p.1300, L.4 - p.1302,
L.6.) Although Kandi later denied that Hall was anything other than verbally and
emotionally abusive, she told her coworkers, including Emmett, that Hall physically
abused her. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.929, Ls.6-8, p.979, L.10 - p.980, L.19, p.1238, Ls.3-20,
p.1244, L.8- p.1245, L.1, p.1302, Ls.7-16.)

2

Emmett, in turn, "intensely disliked" Hall, wanted Kandi to leave him, and was
worried for Kandi's safety. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.905, L.11 - p.906, L.17, p.908, Ls.6-21,
p.909, L.24 - p.910, L.10, p.981, Ls.4-19, p.1244, L.8 - p.1245, L.1; State's Exhibit
77 A.) Although Emmett had a "verbal temper" and talked to others about hurting
Hall if he ever laid a finger on Kandi, Emmett and Hall never had any kind of
physical confrontation before Hall shot and killed Emmett on March 11, 2011. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p.844, L.14 - p.856, L.24, p.1240, L.17 - p.1245, L.1, p.1246, Ls.18-22;
State's Exhibit 77A; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.1267, Ls.9-11 (Emmett's wife of seven
years never saw him in a physical fight with anyone).) In fact, Hall and Emmett had
two face-to-face interactions in late February 2011 - one in the parking lot behind
Emmett's law office and one on the sidewalk in front of the Halls' residence - but
both interactions were strictly verbal. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.844, L.14 - p.856, L.24, p.1240,
L. 17 - p. 1244, L. 7.)
On the afternoon of March 11, 2011, Emmett and Kandi met with an attorney
to discuss the possibility of Kandi seeking a divorce from Hall. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.862,
L.12 - p.863, L.25, p.1315, L.3-p.1317, L.14.) During the meeting, Kandi told the
attorney she needed a protection order against Hall because he "had been
extremely emotionally controlling and abusive."

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.1318, Ls.4-15,

p.1325, L.19 - p.1326, L.3.)
Later that same day, when Kandi arrived home from work, Hall was "[l]oading
boxes in the garage" and he told Kandi he was moving out. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.863, L.18
- p.865, L.7.)

A discussion followed, during which Kandi made up, and then

recanted, a story about having an affair with an attorney in Oregon; she did not
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admit to Hall that she had actually been having an affair with Emmett, but she did
tell him she had seen a divorce attorney earlier that day. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.866, L.5 p.867, L.16, p.980, Ls.20-25.)

While Kandi and Hall were talking, Emmett

attempted to call Kandi and sent her texts expressing concern for her safety. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p.981, Ls.4-16; State's Exhibit 77.)
Hall drank at least one beer and had a shot of tequila while at home on the
evening of March 11, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.867, L.21 - p.869, L.5.) After he and
Kandi finished talking, sometime between 8:00 and 8:45 p.m., both of them left the
house. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.868, L.6 - p.869, L.1.) Hall went to a friend's house, where he
drank another beer and lamented the state of his marriage.

(Tr., Vol. 1., p.869,

Ls.2-6, p.1327, L.15 - p.1338, L.23.) Kandi went to a Walgreens drugstore to pick
up a prescription. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.869, Ls.7-11, p.870, Ls.7-15.)
Soon after Kandi left the house she contacted Emmett and told him she was
on her way to Walgreens. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.869, L.17 - p.870, L.2.) Emmett met Kandi
there and, after she picked up her prescription, the two of them left together in
Emmett's truck. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.870, Ls.3-22.) They drove to a Fred Meyer to get gas
and, from there, drove to a housing development where they had sex in Emmett's
vehicle.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.870, L.24 - p.871, L.16, p.938, L.20 - p.939, L.18, p.941,

L.13 - p.942, L.13.)
While Kandi was with Emmett, her daughter saw Kandi's vehicle at
Walgreens and communicated that information to Hall. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2461, L.14 p.2462, L.14; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.1370, Ls.15-20 (Hall told officers his daughter
told him Kandi was "at Walgreens with the other guy"), p.1372, Ls.15-21 (same).)
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Hall thereafter went to Walgreens to look for Kandi. (See generally State's Exhibit
78 (clips of video surveillance footage from Walgreens on March 11, 2011).) He
parked his truck next to Kandi's vehicle, went inside the store and walked up and
down the aisles. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.424, L.3- p.425, L.12; Tr., Vol. 2, p.1991, L.19 p.1993, L.3; State's Exhibit 78.) He then exited the store and walked around the
building.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.426, L.13 - p.427, L.21; State's Exhibit 78.)

Video

surveillance shows that, while he was walking around outside of the store, Hall
appeared to be "positioning something" in the front pocket of his sweatshirt. (State's
Exhibit 78; see also 11/29/12 Tr., p.10, Ls.13-17 (trial court's findings in relation to
Hall's post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal).) After Hall walked around outside
of the store, he got back in his truck, pulled out of his parking space, and then
backed into the parking space on the opposite side of Kandi's vehicle and waited.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.1994, L.22 - p.1995, L.1; State's Exhibit 78.)
At some point while he was at Walgreens Hall called Kandi and asked her
what she was doing. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.873, Ls.7-18.) Kandi told Hall she was driving
around with Emmett.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.873, Ls.19-23.)

At that point, according to

Kandi, Emmett took the phone from her and asked Hall, "What is up, Chief?" (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p.873, L.25 - p.874, L.23.)

Again according to Kandi, Emmett said

something to the effect of, "Yeah, fucking crack your head," and then told Hall,
"Yeah, just wait there. We'll be there in a minute." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.874, L.24 - p.875,
L.8.) Emmett and Kandi drove into the Walgreens parking lot very shortly thereafter.
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.875, Ls.17-22.)
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After he pulled into the Walgreens parking lot, Emmett got out of his truck
and leaned against the bed of the vehicle. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.877, L.18 - p.879, L.2.)
Hall approached him and a verbal argument ensued.

(Tr., Vol. 1, L.18 - p.881,

L.22.) Although Kandi later claimed that Emmett lunged forward and pushed Hall in
the chest (Tr., Vol. 1, p.881, L.23 - p.882, L.4, p.1394, Ls.4-20), she told police and
at least one friend very near the time of the incident that, up to that point, the
altercation between Hall and Emmett was purely verbal (Tr., Vol. 1, p.994, L.9 p.995, L.6, p.1015, Ls.17-19, p.1184, L.19-p.1185, L.15, p.1186, Ls.16-21, p.1200,
L.6 - p.1201, L.21 ).

Other witnesses who saw Hall and Emmett together in the

Walgreens parking lot also did not see any sort of physical altercation. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.383, L.14 - p.392, L.10, p.405, L.7 - p.410, L.16.) In an attempt to diffuse the
argument Kandi said, "That's enough," and walked away from Hall and Emmett
toward her own vehicle. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.882, Ls.5-22.) She then claims to have heard
"scuffling" behind her, followed by three gunshots. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.882, L.23 - p.883,
L.16.) When she turned around, she saw Hall with a gun in his hand and blood
streaming down his face. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.883, L.17 - p.884, L.15.) Although she did
not immediately see him, Emmett was laying motionless on the ground and had
gunshot wounds to his head and his chest.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.884, Ls.16-17, p.885,

Ls.3-15, p.771, Ls.4-15; State's Exhibits 11-15.)
Kandi rushed to Hall's aid and then called 911. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.884, L.18 p.885, L.2.) While on the phone with the dispatcher, Kandi checked on Emmett and
"literally watched him take his last breath." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.885, L.3 - p.887, L.17.) By
that point, Hall had dropped the gun and was lying on the ground about 10 feet
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away from Emmett. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.883, L.24 - p.884, L.22, p.888, L.3 - p.889, L.8.)
When Hall attempted to get up, Kandi jumped over Emmett and kicked the gun out
of Hall's reach. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.887, L.18 - p.888, L.2, p.889, Ls.9-15.) Kandi was
screaming, "Why, why?" and Hall told Kandi, "You did this.

You did this." (See

State's Exhibit 79 (audio recording of 911 call).)
Emmett was pronounced dead at the scene. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.749, L.2 - p.752,
L.21.) Hall had a four-inch "graze wound" on the top of his head but, by the time he
was transported to the hospital, he was conscious and stable. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.698,
L.12 - p.700, L.18, ) At the hospital, Hall told officers that he and Emmett had
fought over Kandi, that his gun had fallen out of his pocket, that Emmett had
grabbed it and shot him, but that he did not know who shot Emmett. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.1145, L.19 - p.1148, L.15, p.1373, L.12; Defense Exhibits 417 and 418.)
Kandi also made a number of statements to law enforcement, but her version
of what transpired in the Walgreens parking lot changed dramatically over time. In
the early morning hours of March 12, 2011 - just hours after the shooting, Kandi told
officers that Hall confronted Emmett in the Walgreens parking lot and the two men
engaged in a verbal argument (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1015, Ls.8-19, p.1184, L.4 - p.1186,
L.21 ); that although Emmett was "verbally aggressive" and challenged Hall to hit
him, Kandi said there was no physical altercation - that "'[t]here was no fighting no
pushing, no nothing"' (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1015, Ls.17-19, p.1184, L.19 - p.1185, L.15,
p.1186, Ls.16-21, p.1200, L.6 - p.1201, L.21; see also Tr., Vol. 1, p.994, L.9 - p.
995, L.6 (Kandi told friend who picked her up from police station on March 12, 2011,
that altercation between Hall and Emmett was "verbal")); and that the cadence of
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the gunshots was "pop pop, a pause, and then pop" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1015, L.20 p.1016, L.4, p.1187, L.24- p.1188, L.10, p.1393, Ls.4-24). However, in subsequent
interviews and testimony, Kandi claimed that Emmett shoved Hall in the chest (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p.881, L.20 - p.882, L.4, p.1394, Ls.4-20) and that the cadence of the
gunshots was "pop, and then a pause, and pop pop" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.883, Ls.8-16).
At the scene, officers photographed and collected a number of items of
evidentiary value. (See, ~ . State's Exhibits 5-25, 52A, 5288-5211, 60-65, 73-74,
81A, 83-88, 91A.) They searched Hall's truck and found, among other things, an
empty gun holster, printouts of the emails and texts Hall had sent Kandi, and an
envelope containing the letter Hall had written to Emmett's wife. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1446,
L.7 - p.1452, L.8; Tr., Vol. 2, p.1964, L.8 - p.1970, L.7, p.2012, L.23- p.2016, L.17;
State's Exhibits 52A, 5288-5211, 81A, 91A.)

In the parking lot, they found Hall's

Ruger LCP 380 pistol and three spent shell casings. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1425, Ls.4-23,
p.1437, L.9 - p.1441, L.5; State's Exhibits 83, 86-87.) Subsequent testing of the
weapon showed the only DNA on the trigger belonged to Hall. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1715,
Ls.10-16.)
In the days following Emmett's death, Hall and Kandi reconciled and Kandi
vowed she would get Hall "vindicated." (See generally, State's Exhibit 147, tracks 16 (audio recordings of telephone conversations occurring between March 17 and
March 24, 2011 ).) Hall celebrated his renewed relationship with Kandi, telling his
mother in a telephone conversation just five days after he shot and killed Emmett
that, "for the last 10 months, [Kandi] changed .... This is my Kandi. This is the old
Kandi. You know, it's like I changed her back." (State's Exhibit 147, track 7.)
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The state charged Hall with first degree murder and with using a firearm in
the commission of a felony. (R., pp.82-84, 236-37.) Following a trial, a jury found
Hall guilty of second degree murder and of using a firearm in the commission of the
offense. (R., pp.1539-40.) Hall filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the
trial court denied.

(R., pp.1549-1560, 1571-72.)

The court thereafter entered

judgment on the jury's verdict and imposed a unified sentence of 30 years, with 17
years fixed. (R., pp.1680-83.) Hall timely appealed. (R., pp.1688-96, 2518-28.)

g

ISSUES
Hall states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court err when it failed to instruct the jury on the
law of justifiable homicide pursuant to I.C. § 18-4009(1 )?

2.

Did the district court err when it instructed the jury that in order
for a homicide to be justifiable, the defendant must have
believed that the action taken was necessary to save the
defendant from the danger presented, and that the defendant
may only use an objectively reasonable amount of force, as
they are incorrect statements of the law?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it excluded Mr.
Corrigan's Facebook statements from evidence?

4.

Did the district court err when it allowed Mr. Toluse to testify
about what he taught in his concealed carry class?

5.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr.
Hall's Fourteenth Amendment Right to Due Process of Law
violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his
right to a fair trial?

(Appellant's brief, p.15)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Hall failed to show the trial court erred in declining to give his proposed
justifiable homicide instruction where such instruction was adequately
covered by other instructions and, in any event, was not supported by the
facts of the case?

2.

Has Hall failed to demonstrate the trial court committed fundamental error
when, consistent with Hall's request at trial, it instructed the jury on the law of
self-defense?

3.

Has Hall failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
Emmett's Facebook statements?

4.

Has Hall failed to establish the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Mr.
Toluse to testify about what he taught Hall in his concealed carry class?

5.

Has Hall failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Hall Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Erred In Declining To Give His Proposed
Justifiable Homicide Instruction
A.

Introduction
Hall's defense to the murder charge in this case rested on two alternative,

and inherently conflicting, theories: (1) Hall's gun fell out of his pocket and, while
he and Emmett were fighting over it, it accidently discharged, with two of the three
discharged bullets striking and killing Emmett; (2) after the gun fell out of Hall's
pocket, Emmett grabbed it and shot Hall, and Hall, after being shot, somehow
managed to regain control of the weapon and shoot Emmett in self-defense. (Tr.,
Vol. 2, p.2509, Ls.10-20, p.2607, L.18 - p.2608, L.2.) Arguing there was evidence
presented at trial that supported both of these theories, Hall asked the trial court to
instruct the jury on the laws of excusable homicide, justifiable homicide and selfdefense. (R., pp.1237-38, 1245-51; Tr., Vol. 2, p.2504, L.3- p.2505, L.11, p.2509,
Ls.10-20.) Ultimately, the court gave the pattern criminal jury instructions on selfdefense and excusable homicide (compare R., pp.1518-20 with ICJI 1516 and
1517), but it declined to give Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction,
concluding it was covered by the self-defense instruction and that giving a separate
justifiable homicide instruction would only confuse the jury (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2526,
Ls.10-17).
On appeal, Hall argues the trial court erred by declining to instruct the jury on
the law of justifiable homicide as set forth in I.C. § 18-4009(1 ). (Appellant's brief,
pp.16-29.)

Specifically, he contends that, in lieu of the pattern self-defense
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instruction or the entire justifiable homicide instruction he actually asked the court to
give, the court should have given that portion of his proposed justifiable homicide
instruction that stated a homicide is justifiable if "committed while resisting an
attempt to do great bodily injury upon any person, including the defendant."
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-29; see also Appellant's brief, pp.29-36 (arguing for first
time on appeal that court erred by giving pattern self-defense instruction).) Hall,
however, never asked the trial court to give only that portion of his proposed
justifiable homicide instruction he identifies on appeal. His appellate claim that the
trial court erred by not doing so is therefore unpreserved and not properly before this
Court.
Even if Hall's instructional error claim is preserved, it fails on its merits. The
district court correctly concluded Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction was
covered by the self-defense instruction and that giving a separate instruction on
justifiable homicide would confuse the jury.

Even if the instruction was not

adequately covered by the self-defense instruction, a review of the record shows
there was no evidence presented at trial from which a rational jury could conclude
that Hall shot Emmett while resisting an attempt by Emmett to inflict upon Hall any
great bodily injury.

Because the evidence did not support a justifiable homicide

defense under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), Hall was not entitled to an instruction on that
theory.
Finally, even if the trial court erred by not giving that portion of Hall's
proposed justifiable homicide instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), any
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such error was harmless and neither lowered the state's burden of proof nor
otherwise violated Hall's right to a fair trial.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which this

Court exercises free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414,
430 (2009). "An error in jury instructions only constitutes reversible error when the
instruction misled the jury or prejudiced the party challenging the instruction."

kl

(citation omitted). "If the instructions, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately
present the issues and state the applicable law, then no error has been committed."

kl (quotations,
C.

citation and brackets omitted).

Hall's Claim That The Trial Court Should Have Given Only That Portion Of
His Proposed Justifiable Homicide Instruction That Was Based On l.C. § 184009(1) - In Lieu Of A Self-Defense Instruction And The Entire Justifiable
Homicide Instruction He Actually Proposed - Is Not An Issue Preserved For
Appeal
The week before trial, Hall submitted for the trial court's consideration several

proposed jury instructions, including proposed instructions on both excusable and
justifiable homicide.

(R., pp.1129-40.)

Hall's proposed justifiable homicide

instruction, patterned loosely after ICJI 1514, set forth the numerous circumstances
under which a homicide is justifiable pursuant l.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010. (See
R., pp.1237-38.)

In summary, the proposed instruction stated a "homicide is

justifiable in any one of the following three (3) circumstances": (1) when "committed
while resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury" (compare I.C. § 18-4009(1)); (2)
when committed in defense of any person "against one who manifestly intends or
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endeavors, by violence or surprise, to commit a felony," where the circumstances
are "sufficient to create a fear in a reasonable person and the defendant ... acted
under the influence of such fears alone" (compare I.C. §§ 18-4009(2) and 18-401 O);
and (3) when "committed in the lawful defense of the defendant when there are
reasonable grounds to apprehend a design to do some great bodily injury and
imminent danger of such design being accomplished," where the circumstances are
"sufficient to create a fear in a reasonable person and the defendant ... acted under
the influence of such fears alone" (compare I.C. §§ 18-4009(3) and 18-4010).2 (R.,
pp.1237-38.)
In addition to proposing specific instructions on excusable and justifiable
homicide, Hall also asked the trial court to give a self-defense instruction. (See Tr.,
Vol. 2, p.2505, Ls.7-11 (defense counsel asking court to give instructions on
excusable homicide, justifiable homicide, and self-defense).)

After an extensive

discussion, during which Hall's trial counsel acknowledged an overlap between the
self-defense and justifiable homicide instructions (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2504, L.3 - p.2506,
L.16), the court gave the pattern self-defense and excusable homicide instructions
but declined to give a separate instruction on justifiable homicide (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2502, L.19-p.2511, L.19, p.2520, L.15-p.2521, L.11, p.2526, Ls.11-17, p.2543,
L.25 - p.2547, L.2; R., pp.1518-22).
On appeal, Hall does not challenge the court's decision to not give the
justifiable homicide instruction he actually proposed. Instead, he argues that, in lieu

2

Due to its length, the entirety of Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction is
not reproduced verbatim herein. For the Court's convenience, a copy of the entire
proposed instruction is attached to this brief as Appendix A.
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of that instruction and the instructions on self-defense that he orally requested, the
court should have given only that portion of his proposed justifiable homicide
instruction that, consistent with I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), stated a homicide is justifiable
when "committed while resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury upon any
person, including the defendant." (Appellant's brief, pp.16-36.) This Court should
decline to consider Hall's appellate claim because Hall did not preserve it below.
"The longstanding rule of this Court is that [it] will not consider issues that are
raised for the first time on appeal." Barmore v. Perrone, 145 Idaho 340, 343, 179
P.3d 303, 306 (2008) (internal quotes omitted).

An objection on one basis is

insufficient to preserve an objection on a completely different basis. State v. Norton,
134 Idaho 875, 880, 11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing I.RE. 103(a)(1 ); State
v. Gleason, 130 Idaho 586, 592, 944 P.2d 721, 727 (Ct. App. 1997)) ("For an
objection to be preserved for appellate review, the specific ground for the objection
must be clearly stated."). This rule applies equally to jury instructions. Pursuant to
I.C.R. 30(b), "[n]o party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its
verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of
the objection." Absent a specific objection below, a claim of instructional error will
only be reviewed on appeal for fundamental error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,
227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010).
Hall contends on appeal that the trial court was required to give that portion of
his proposed justifiable homicide instruction that was based on I. C. § 18-4009( 1)
because, he asserts, it was a correct statement of the law, was not adequately
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covered by other instructions, and was supported by the evidence.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.16-28.) Hall, however, never asked the trial court to give only that portion
of his proposed instruction setting forth the elements of justifiable homicide under
I.C. § 18-4009(1). Rather, he asked the court to give his entire proposed instruction,
based on I.C. §§ 18-4009(1)-(3) and 18-4010, and to also instruct the jury on the law
of self-defense. (R., pp.1237-38, 1245-51; Tr., Vol. 2, p.2504, L.3 - p.2505, L.11,
p.2509, Ls.10-20.) That Hall now believes the court should have disregarde9 his
actual requests and instructed the jury exclusively on the law of justifiable homicide
under I.C. § 18-4009(1) does not transform the issue into one that was preserved for
appeal.

Hall's appellate claim of entitlement to a justifiable homicide instruction

based solely on I.C. § 18-4009(1) is not the same claim he made to the trial court
below and, as such, is not an issue that was preserved for appeal.
Because the issue was not preserved,
fundamental error.

it may only be reviewed for

Perry, 150 Idaho at 227, 245 P.3d at 979.

The burden of

demonstrating fundamental error, however, rests squarely with the defendant
asserting the error for the first time on appeal. kt_ at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. To carry
that burden, the defendant must demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates
one or more of [his] unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the
need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was
not harmless." kt_
Hall has not even argued, much less demonstrated, that the failure of the trial
court to have sua sponte instructed the jury on the law of justifiable homicide
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exclusively as set forth in I.C. § 18-4009(1) constituted fundamental error under the
standards articulated in Perry. Because the issue Hall raises on appeal was neither
presented to or decided by the trial court, and because Hall has not even asserted
fundamental error, much less attempted to carry his burden of demonstrating it, this
Court must decline to consider the merits of Hall's instructional error claim. 3

D.

Even If Preserved, Hall's Claim That The Trial Court Erred By Not Instructing
The Jury Exclusively On The Law Of Justifiable Homicide As Set Forth In I.C.
§ 18-4009( 1) Fails; The Instruction Was Covered By Other Instructions And,
In Any Event, Was Not Supported By The Evidence
"A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all

matters of law necessary for the jury's information." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132).

"This necessarily

includes instructions on the 'nature and elements of the crime charged and the
essential legal principles applicable to the evidence that has been admitted."'

l9.:

(citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004)). It also
includes, when requested, instructions on "every defense or theory of the defense
having any support in the evidence." State v. Turner, 136 Idaho 629, 633, 38 P.3d
1285, 1289 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 328, 986 P.2d
346, 351 (Ct. App. 1999)). Although "[e]ach party is entitled to request the delivery
of specific instructions," "such instructions will be given [only] if they are 'correct and
pertinent."' Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430 (citing I.C. § 19-2132). "A
proposed instruction is not 'correct and pertinent' if it is (1) an erroneous statement

3

Even if Hall had argued fundamental error in relation to this issue, for the reasons
set forth in Sections I.D., I.E., and 11.C., infra, he would be unable to carry his burden
of demonstrating it.
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of the law; (2) adequately covered by other instructions; or (3) 'not supported by the
facts of the case."' Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31 (citing State
v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278,285,647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982)).
Even if preserved, Hall's claim that the trial court erred by not giving that
portion of his proposed justifiable homicide instruction that was based solely on I.C.

§ 18-4009(1) fails.

The proposed instruction was not "correct and pertinent"

because it was adequately covered by other instructions and was not supported by
the facts of the case.

1.

Hall's Proposed Justifiable Homicide Instruction Was Adequately
Covered By Other Instructions

The circumstances under which a homicide is justifiable under Idaho law are
set forth in I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010, as follows:

18-4009. Justifiable homicide by any person. - Homicide is
also justifiable when committed by any person in either of the following
cases:
1. When resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to
commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person; or,
2. When committed in defense of habitation, property or
person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence
or surprise, to commit a felony, or against one who manifestly intends
and endeavors, in a violent, riotous or tumultuous manner, to enter the
habitation of another for the purpose of offering violence to any person
therein; or,
3. When committed in the lawful defense of such person, or of
a wife or husband, parent, child, master, mistress or servant of such
person, when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design to
commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury, and imminent
danger of such design being accomplished; but such person, or the
person in whose behalf the defense was made, if he was the assailant
or engaged in mortal combat, must really and in good faith have
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endeavored to decline any further struggle before the homicide was
committed; or,
4. When necessarily committed in attempting, by lawful ways
and means, to apprehend any person for any felony committed, or in
lawfully suppressing any riot, or in lawfully keeping and preserving the
peace.
I.C. § 18-4009.
18-4010. Fear not sufficient justification. - A bare fear of the
commission of any of the offenses mentioned in subdivisions 2 and 3
of the preceding section, to prevent which homicide may be lawfully
committed, is not sufficient to justify it. But the circumstances must be
sufficient to excite the fears of a reasonable person, and the party
killing must have acted under the influence of such fears alone.
I.C. § 18-4010.
Consistent with these statutory provisions, the Idaho Supreme Court has
approved two pattern criminal jury instructions for use where a defendant charged
with homicide contends as a defense at trial that the killing was justifiable. The first
approved instruction, entitled "Justifiable Homicide Defense," is nearly a verbatim
recitation of the law of justifiable homicide as set forth in I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 184010. See ICJI 1514 (and comments thereto). The second approved instruction,
entitled "Self-Defense," is also based on I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010, but is also
suitable for use in battery cases where the defendant claims to have acted in selfdefense. See ICJI 1517 (and comments thereto); see also State v. Hansen, 133
Idaho 323, 329 n.6, 986 P.2d 346, 352 n.6 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting ICJI 1517 is
designed for use in either homicide or battery cases where defendant claims
homicide or battery was justified because committed in self-defense). Specifically,
as it relates to homicide cases, the approved self-defense instruction provides:
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A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in selfdefense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of
the following conditions must be found to have been in existence at the
time of the killing:
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed
that the action the defendant took was necessary to save the
defendant from the danger presented.
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the
defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury and
believed that the action taken was necessary.
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that
danger and not for some other motivation.
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of
danger, the right of self-defense ends.
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs,
you should determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might
have concluded from all the facts and circumstances which the
evidence shows existed at that time, and not with the benefit of
hindsight
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must
have so appeared to a reasonable person under the circumstances. A
bare fear of death or great bodily injury is not sufficient to justify a
homicide. The defendant must have acted under the influence of
fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar
position.
The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable
doubt whether the homicide was justifiable, you must find the
defendant not guilty.
ICJI 1517 (brackets and language pertaining to defense of others and battery cases
omitted).
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Consistent with Hall's request that it do so (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2505, Ls.9-11 ), the
trial court in this case gave the pattern self-defense instruction (compare R.,
pp.1519-20 with ICJI 1517), as well as a pattern instruction on the "kind and degree
of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense" (compare R., p.1521 with
ICJI 1518), but it declined to give Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction,
finding it was adequately covered by the instructions on self-defense (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2526, Ls.11-17).

Hall argues the trial court erred, contending the pattern self-

defense instructions the court gave did "not adequately apprise the jury of the law of
justifiable homicide as codified in I.C. § 18-4009(1)."

(Appellant's brief, p.27.)

Specifically, he argues the self-defense instructions were not sufficient to cover the
law of justifiable homicide as set forth in I.C. § 18-4009(1) because the self-defense
instructions require a showing that the defendant's actions and beliefs were
objectively reasonable whereas, according to Hall, I.C. § 18-4009(1) does not.
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-27.)

Hall's argument does not withstand scrutiny.

A

comparison of the elements of justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1) to the
elements of self-defense as articulated in the self-defense instructions actually
given 4 shows that the law relevant to a justifiable homicide claim under l.C. § 184009(1) was necessarily included in and covered by the court's instructions on selfdefense.
There are two elements of justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1): (1)
the person killed was "attempt[ing] to ... do some great bodily injury" to the

4

For this Court's convenience, copies of the pattern self-defense instructions the
trial court gave are attached to this brief as Appendix B.
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defendant, and (2) the defendant was "resisting" that attempt.

Self-defense has

more than two elements but, contrary to Hall's assertions on appeal, those elements
necessarily include and incorporate the circumstance contemplated by I.C. § 184009(1) of a homicide committed in resistance to an actual attempt to do great
bodily injury.

Specifically, the elements of self-defense are: (1) the defendant

"believed [he) was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm"; (2) the
defendant "believed that the action [he) took was necessary to save [him] from the
danger presented"; (3) "a reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would
have believed that the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury and believed that the action taken was necessary"; (4) "[t]he defendant must
have acted only in response to that danger and not for some other reason"; and (5)
"[w]hen there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of selfdefense ends." (Compare R., pp.1519-20 with ICJI 1517.)
Other than allowing for consideration of the defendant's subjective beliefs,
the first two elements of self-defense are virtually identical to the elements of
justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1). If the jury had believed based on the
evidence that Hall committed the homicide in resistance to an actual attempt to
inflict great bodily injury, the jury could only have concluded under elements one and
two of the self-defense instruction that Hall "believed [he] was in imminent danger of
... great bodily harm" and also "believed the action he took was necessary to save
him from" that actual danger.

That elements one and two of the self-defense

instruction actually permitted the jury to consider Hall's subjective perceptions in no
way diminished the state's burden of proving the homicide was not justifiable; to the
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contrary, it worked to Hall's benefit by allowing him to argue self-defense not only if
he was in fact resisting an actual attempt to cause him great bodily harm but also if
he mistakenly believed he was doing so.
The third element of self-defense -

requiring a showing of objective

reasonableness in the defendant's beliefs and actions - is likewise consistent with
the elements of justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ). Again, had the jury
been presented with evidence showing that Hall shot Emmett while resisting an

actual attempt by Emmett to do some great bodily injury upon him, the jury could
only have concluded that Hall's beliefs that he was in imminent danger of great
bodily harm and that shooting Emmett was necessary to save him from that danger
were objectively reasonable.

Because the elements of justifiable homicide under

I.C. § 18-4009(1) themselves require a showing of actual resistance to an actual
attempt to do great bodily injury, allowing a jury to find the defendant not guilty
merely if his actions and beliefs were objectively reasonable does not impose a
greater requirement than exists under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), but rather a lesser one.
The fourth element of self-defense - requiring the defendant to "have acted
only in response to that danger and not for some other motivation" - is not only
consistent with the law of justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), it is actually
the crux of a justifiable homicide defense under that statute. In order for a homicide
to be justifiable under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), the defendant must actually have been
"resisting" the "attempt ... to do some great bodily injury."

In other words, the

defendant must have been acting in response to the attempt to do great bodily
injury, and not for some other reason or to accomplish some other end. Element
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four of the self-defense instruction thus did not add an element to justifiable
homicide that does not already exist under I.C. § 18-4009(1).
The fifth element of the court's self-defense instruction directed the jury that,
"[w]hen there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self
defense ends."

Like all of the other elements of self-defense, this element is

consistent with, and does not add to, the elements of justifiable homicide under I.C.
§ 18-4009(1 ).

As even Hall recognizes on appeal, the viability of a justifiable

homicide defense under I.C. § 18-4009(1) depends upon a showing that the
homicide was "committed in response to an actual, on-going attempt by a
perpetrator to commit serious bodily injury upon the accused." (Appellant's brief,
p.18; see also pp.18-27 (repeatedly acknowledging that a homicide is justifiable
under I.C. § 18-4009(1) only if committed in response to "an actual on-going violent
attack").)

Because a homicide committed when there is not even a "reasonable

appearance of danger" is never justifiable under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), element five of
the self-defense instruction was a correct statement of the law of justifiable homicide
as set forth in that statute.
In addition to the above elements, the trial court instructed the jury that the
"kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense" must be
no greater than "that apparently and reasonably necessary under the existing facts
and circumstances." (R., p.1521; compare ICJI 1518.) This requirement did not
make it easier for the state to prove that the homicide was not justifiable. Had the
jury believed that Emmett was actually attempting to inflict great bodily injury upon
Hall, as opposed to only threatening to do so, the jury could have only concluded
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that Hall's act of shooting Emmett in resistance to that actual attack was objectively
reasonable.

This is especially true given the repeated emphasis the defense

attempted to place on evidence that Emmett was stronger and generally more
aggressive than Hall, intensely disliked him, and had threatened earlier in the night
to "crack" Hall's "fucking head." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.905, L.15 - p.906, L.17, p.920, Ls.123, p.943, L.22-p.945, L.18, p.948, Ls.19-25, p.1247, L.16-p.1248, L.10; Tr., Vol.
2, p.2587, Ls.16-17, p.2593, Ls.3-6.)
As shown above, a comparison of the elements of self-defense with those of
justifiable homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1) demonstrates that, while the elements
of self-defense are broader than those of justifiable homicide in that they allow for
acquittal based on a defendant's reasonable perceptions that the action taken was
necessary to defend against a perceived threat of great bodily harm, those elements
necessarily encompass the circumstance contemplated by l.C. § 18-4009(1) of a
homicide committed in resistance to an actual attempt to commit great bodily harm
because, by definition, resisting an actual ongoing violent attack is objectively
reasonable.

Because the self-defense instructions actually given necessarily

covered that portion of Hall's proposed justifiable homicide instruction that was
based on I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), the trial court did not err in declining to give Hall's
proposed instruction.

2.

Hall's Proposed Justifiable Homicide Instruction Was Not Supported
By The Facts Of The Case

A trial court is not required to instruct the jury on a defense theory if the
requested instruction, even if a correct statement of the law, is "not supported by the
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facts of the case." State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 285, 647 P.2d 734, 741 (1982),
quoted in Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d at 430-31; see also State v.
Livesay, 71 Idaho 442, 447, 233 P.2d 432, 435 (1951) ("An instruction which might
contain a correct abstract principle of law is erroneous and prejudicial in a case
where it has no application to the facts involved.").

Even if the law of justifiable

homicide as codified in I.C. § 18-4009(1) was not adequately covered by the selfdefense instructions the trial court gave, the trial court did not err by not giving that
portion of Hall's justifiable homicide instruction that was based on I.C. § 18-4009(1)
because such instruction was not supported by the facts of the case.
In order for Hall to be entitled to an instruction based on the law of justifiable
homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), there must have been some evidence presented
at trial to show that Hall committed the homicide while resisting an actual attempt by
Emmett to inflict upon Hall some great bodily injury -

or, as Hall himself

characterizes it, there must have been evidence that Hall shot and killed Emmett "in
response to an actual, on-going violent attack." (Appellant's brief, pp.18-27.)

No

such evidence was presented. While Kandi testified at trial that, minutes before the
deadly confrontation, Emmett was angry and had threatened over the telephone to
"fucking crack [Hall's] head" (Tr., Vol. 1, p.873, L.7 - p.875, L.22, p.943, L.22 p.945, L.13), such testimony, even if believed by the jury, 5 did not remotely
demonstrate that, at the time Hall shot him, Emmett was actually attacking Hall or

5

Although the jury was free to believe Kandi's testimony, Kandi was far from a
reliable witness. In fact, at the hearing on Hall's post-trial motion for a judgment of
acquittal, the trial court observed: "Frankly, any testimony by Ms. Hall, in my 31
years on the bench I don't think I've seen a witness more thoroughly discredited in
the course of a proceeding." (11/29/12 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-8.)
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attempting to inflict any great bodily injury upon him. Likewise, Kandi's testimony
that, before Hall shot him, Emmett shoved Hall in the chest (Tr., Vol. 1, p.881, L.23
- p.882, L.4) is not evidence that Emmett was attempting to inflict great bodily injury
at all, much less that he was attempting to do so at the time Hall fired the bullets into
his chest and head. Kandi testified that Emmett did not even push Hall hard enough
to make him fall down; and Hall did not push Emmett back, much less shoot him in
resistance to the chest shove. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.881, L.24 - p.882, L.4, p.955, L.20 p.956, L.24.)
The only people who were present at the time Hall shot Emmett were
Emmett, Kandi and Hall himself. Emmett was obviously unavailable to testify as a
witness at trial. Kandi was walking away from Hall and Emmett when the shots were
fired and thus was unable to testify about what the circumstances of the shooting
actually were. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.882, L.5 - p.883, L.9.) She did testify that she heard
"scuffling on the ground" immediately before the shots were fired (Tr., Vol. 1, p.882,
L.19- p.883, L.7, p.958, Ls.4-11), but that testimony, even if believed, did not show
Emmett was attempting to do some great bodily harm to Hall when Hall shot him; it
merely showed exactly what Kandi testified to - that she "heard scuffling."
Because he was the only living eye-witness to the shooting, Hall was the only
person who could possibly have shed light on what was transpiring at the moment
he shot and killed Emmett. As was his absolute right, Hall did not testify at trial, but
the defense did introduce into evidence two audio recordings of the statements Hall
made to police on the night of the shooting. (See Defense Exhibits 417 and 418.)
Those audio recordings show that, when asked by police what happened in the
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Walgreens parking lot, Hall told them (1) he and Emmett fought over Kandi, but he
did not know what happened during the fight; (2) Emmett was angry and accused
Hall of mistreating Kandi; (3) Hall had a gun but Emmett did not; (4) Hall's gun fell
out of his pocket and he and Emmett fought over it; (5) Emmett grabbed the gun
and shot Hall; (6) Hall did not know how Emmett got shot. (Defense Exhibits 417
and 418.)

While these statements, if believed, could establish an attempt by

Emmett to do some great bodily harm upon Hall, they in no way demonstrate Hall
fired the bullets into Emmett's chest and head "when resisting" that attack.
undisputed that the only gun at the scene belonged to Hall.

It is

If, as Hall claimed,

Emmett shot him using that gun there is no conceivable way Hall could have used
that same gun to simultaneously resist that alleged attack. Rather, Hall could only
have obtained the gun and used it to shoot Emmett after Emmett had already shot
him. Such a circumstance would clearly not qualify as a homicide committed "when
resisting" an "attempt to ... do great bodily harm" under I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), nor was
that even Hall's theory at trial.
In addition to introducing the audio recordings of Hall's police interviews, the
defense presented the testimony and written report of firearms and crime scene
reconstruction expert Kay Sweeney to explain what he believed to be the probable
sequence of events leading to Emmett's death. (See generally Tr., Vol. 2, pp.22632405; Defense Exhibit 445.)

Based on his review of the evidence, Mr. Sweeney

opined that Emmett was "shot in the chest while in at least a semi-standing and bent
over, but stationary, position," that the shot was fired directly at him from a distance
of 10 to 14 inches away, and that before the bullet entered Emmett's chest it hit an
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"intermediate target" - that being Hall's scalp. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2337, Ls.14-24, p.2349,
L.24 - p.2353, L.8, p.2363, L.11 - p.2365, LA, p.2387, L.25 - p.2388, L.17;
Defense Exhibit 445, p.9.) Mr. Sweeney further opined that the shot to Emmett's
head "was discharged in close succession to the chest wound shot" while Emmett
"was falling or beginning to fall" to the ground. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2389, Ls.2-23; Defense
Exhibit 445, p.9.) Mr. Sweeney's theory was thus not that Hall shot Emmett in selfdefense, but that the gun somehow discharged while Hall and Emmett were
standing 10 to 14 inches apart, with the first discharged bullet grazing Hall's scalp
and then entering Emmett's chest and the second discharged bullet striking Emmett
in the head.

While this theory may have supported the giving of the excusable

homicide instruction (see R., p.1518), it did not support the giving of a justifiable
homicide instruction based on I.C. § 18-4009(1 ).
In arguing that the trial court erred by not giving a justifiable homicide
instruction based solely on I.C. § 18-4009(1), Hall claims "there was simply no
evidence presented that would counter the claim, definitively or otherwise, that Mr.
Corrigan physically attacked Mr. Hall, and that the homicide was committed in
response to Mr. Corrigan's actual, ongoing attempt to inflict serious bodily injury
upon him." (Appellant's brief, p.28.) Hall misapprehends the legal standard. The
question is not whether there was evidence to "counter" a claim of justifiable
homicide under I.C. § 18-4009(1) but whether there was any evidence to supporl it.
Because, as explained above, no such evidence was presented, Hall has failed to
show the trial court erred by not giving his requested instruction.
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E.

If The Trial Court Erred In Not Giving A Justifiable Homicide Instruction
Based On I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), The Error Was Harmless
Even if the trial court erred by not giving a justifiable homicide instruction

based on I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), Hall is incorrect in his assertion that the state cannot
meet its burden of demonstrating such error was harmless. An instructional error is
harmless where it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would
have found the defendant guilty absent the error." Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.
1, 18 (1999); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976
(2010).

Applying this standard to the facts of this case, there are at least two

reasons why this Court can easily conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that, had it
been instructed on the law of justifiable homicide set forth in I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), the
jury still would have found Hall guilty of second degree murder.
First, the self-defense instructions actually given required the jury to find the
homicide was justified if the evidence showed Hall reasonably believed that shooting
Emmett was necessary to defend against an objectively reasonable threat of death
or great bodily harm. The jury rejected this defense and, in so doing, necessarily
rejected any theory that Hall was actually defending himself against a real (as
opposed to apparent) attempt by Emmett to inflict some great bodily harm. Because
there is no circumstance in which Hall could have been resisting an actual attempt
to do great bodily harm and not also have been engaged in self-defense as defined
in the court's instructions, any error in not giving a justifiable homicide instruction
based on the precise language of I.C. § 18-4009(1) was necessarily harmless.
The second reason the alleged error was harmless is that the evidence
presented at trial overwhelming established both that Hall acted with malice and that
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the homicide was not justified.

Specifically, the evidence showed that, in the

months leading up to Emmett's death, Hall knew Emmett and Kandi were having an
affair and was tormented by that fact. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.983, L.19- p.985, L.14, p.1020,
L.12 - p.1023, L.23, p.1024, Ls.19-24, p.1028, L.15, p.1054, L.21 - p.1055, L.3,
p.1064, L.2 - p.1066, L.7, p.1227, L.2 - p.1231, L.9, p.1327, L.15 - p.1330, L.10;
State's Exhibits 46, 52A, 52BB-52I1.) He told friends, coworkers and acquaintances
about his marital difficulties and expressed on more than one occasion that he
wanted his old Kandi back. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1020, L.12 - p.1032, L.16, p.1054, L.3 p.1058, L.8, p.1064, L.2-p.1066, L.13, p.1162, L.13-p.1164, L.14, p.1227, L.2p.1231, L.9, p.1327, L.15- p.1330, L.10, p.1341, L.16- p.1343, L.3; State's Exhibit
46.)

He wrote Kandi a series of emotionally charged text messages and emails,

including one wishing her "[g]ood luck with [E]mmett" and warning, "Karma is a bitch
and I will have the last laugh." (State's Exhibits 52A, 52BB-52I1.) He also wrote a
letter to Emmett's wife telling her about the affair. (State's Exhibit 81A.) Hall had
those emails and the letter with him in his truck when he went to Walgreens on the
evening of March 11, 2011. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1446, L.5 - p.1447, L.6, p.1451, L.7 p.1452, L.9; Tr., Vol. 2, p.1964, L.8-p.1970, L.7, p.2012, L.23-p.2016, L.17.)
Hall went to Walgreens because his daughter told him that Kandi was there
"with the other guy." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1370, Ls.15-20, p.1372, Ls.15-21; Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2461, L.14 - p.2462, L.14.) After unsuccessfully searching for Kandi inside and
outside of the store, Hall returned to his truck and waited for several minutes.
(State's Exhibit 78.) When Emmett and Kandi arrived at the Walgreens parking lot,
Hall got out of his truck and approached Emmett with a loaded, unholstered gun in
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his pocket. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.877, L.4 - p.878, L.15, p.1095, L.8 - p.1098, L.24, p.1373,
Ls.1-10, p.1448, Ls.9-15.) Although Kandi testified at trial that Emmett shoved Hall
(Tr., Vol. 1, p.881, L.23 - p.882, L.4, p.1394, Ls.4-20), she told police and others
very near the date of the incident that, up until she heard shots, the confrontation
had been strictly verbal (Tr., Vol. 1, p.994, L.9-p.995, L.6, p.1015, Ls.8-19, p.1184,
L.4 - p.1186, L.21, p.1200, L.6 - p.1201, L.21).

Kandi's initial statements were

consistent with those of another witness who, while driving past the Walgreens
parking lot, saw Hall and Emmett standing a "[n]ormal conversational distance apart"
from one another seconds before the shots were fired.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.405, L.7 -

p.410, L.16.) They were also consistent with evidence which showed that, apart
from the graze wound to his head, Hall had no injuries indicating he had been in a
physical fight or struggle. 6 (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1900, L.13 - p.1901, L.7.)
Other evidence presented at trial also established, at least circumstantially,
that Emmett was not the aggressor.

Testing showed that the only DNA on the

In addition to the gunshot wounds to his chest and head, Emmett had an abrasion
on his forehead, healing injuries on his neck and right hand, and "little abrasions"
between the knuckles of his left hand. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1772, Ls.4-9, p.1785, L.25 p.1787, L.4, p.1847, Ls.15-25.) The state's expert testified the abrasion on
Emmett's forehead was consistent with having fallen at the time of death, that the
healing injuries were "older" and did not occur at the time of the shooting, and that
the abrasions on Emmett's knuckles, while "fresh," could have been up to one day
old. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 1781, Ls.3-10, p.1785, L.25 - p.1787, L.4, p.1788, Ls.9-19,
p.1851, Ls.2-9.) Even assuming the "fresh" injuries occurred at the time of the
shooting, there is at least a fair inference that those injuries were the result of
Emmett falling to the ground and not of any struggle or fight between Hall and
Emmett; the state and defense experts both testified that Emmett would have fallen
immediately to the ground upon being shot in the chest (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1807, L.16 p.1808, L.1808, L.6, p.2291, Ls.6-11, p.2305, Ls.6-10), and, as noted above, apart
from the graze wound to his head, Hall had no apparent injuries at all, much less
any injuries that would have been consistent with Emmett having hit Hall hard
enough to leave abrasions on Emmett's fingers but no marks on Hall at all.
6
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trigger of the gun belonged to Hall (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1715), that there was significantly
more gunpowder on Hall's hands than on Emmett's (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1524, Ls.5-7,
p.1527, L.24 - p.1528, L.8), and that the amount and distribution of gunpowder on
Emmett's hands could be consistent with a "shielding motion" (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1524,
Ls.5-18).

In addition, based on his review of the physical evidence, the state's

expert determined Emmett was shot from a distance of two to three feet away. (Tr.,
Vol. 2, p.1552, L.5 - p.1554, L.5.)

Moreover, while there is no question Hall

sustained a grazing-type gunshot wound to his scalp, Hall's own expert could not
even say that the graze wound was the result of any aggressive act by Emmett.
Instead, he testified that the bullet that passed through Hall's scalp was the same
bullet that was actually directed toward, and ultimately penetrated, Emmett's chest.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.2337, Ls.14-24, p.2349, L.24 - p.2353, L.8, p.2363, L.11 - p.2365,
L.4, p.2388, L.25 - p.2388, L.17; Defense Exhibit 445, p.9.) Finally, as noted by the
district court in its oral ruling denying Hall's post-trial motion for judgment of
acquittal, the number and location of the gunshot wounds Emmett sustained was
simply not consistent with someone aiming a firearm "in the throes of a wrestling
match, [or] fist fight, where even the best of marksman might misfire because they
are being pushed or shoved." (11/29/12 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.5.) To the contrary,
the shots, either one of which would independently have been fatal, appeared to be
"very well-aimed" at Emmett's chest and head. (11/29/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-6; Tr., Vol.
2, p.1776, L.17-p.1779, L.11, p.1789, L.7-p.1791, L.1.)
In light of all of the above evidence and the evidence that, just five days after
he shot and killed Emmett Hall made statements celebrating the fact that "the old
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Kandi" was back and it was "like [he] changed her back" (State's Exhibit 147, track
7), there is no reasonable possibility the jury would have found Hall not guilty of
second degree murder had a jury instruction mirroring the language of I.C. § 184009(1) been given. The evidence overwhelmingly established that Hall acted with
malice aforethought when he shot Emmett in the chest and head and that his acts of
doing so were in no manner legally justified. Thus, even if the trial court erred by not
giving a justifiable homicide instruction based on I.C. § 18-4009(1 ), the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

11.
Hall Has Failed To Demonstrate The Trial Court Committed Fundamental Error
When, Consistent With Hall's Request At Trial, It Instructed The Jury On The Law
Of Self-Defense

A.

Introduction
Hall asked the court to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense. (Tr., Vol. 2,

p.2504, L.23 - p.2505, L.11.)

Consistent with that request, the court gave the

pattern criminal jury instructions on self-defense.

(Compare R., pp.1519-21 with

ICJI 1517 and 1518.) Hall now contends the trial court erred by giving the pattern
self-defense instructions because, he argues, those instructions misstated the law of
justifiable homicide as set forth in I.C. § 18-4009. (Appellant's brief, pp.29-36.) This
Court should decline to consider the merits of Hall's claims for two reasons. First,
because Hall specifically asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the law of selfdefense, his claim that the court erred by doing so is barred by the doctrine of
invited error. Second, even if the alleged error was not invited, Hall cannot meet his
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burden of demonstrating that the giving of the pattern self-defense instructions, in a
case where Hall claimed self-defense, constituted fundamental error.

B.

Hall's Claim That The Trial Court Erred By Giving The Pattern Self-Defense
Instructions Is Barred By The Doctrine Of Invited Error
"It has long been the law in Idaho that one may not successfully complain of

errors one has acquiesced in or invited.

Errors consented to, acquiesced in, or

invited are not reversible." State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 379, 313 P.3d 1, 35
(2013) (quoting State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836, 838, 673 P.2d 436, 438 (1983))
(internal citations omitted). "The purpose of the invited error doctrine is to prevent a
party who caused or played an important role in prompting a trial court to give or not
give an instruction from later challenging that decision on appeal." State v. Blake,
133 Idaho 237, 240, 985 P.2d 117, 120 (1999), quoted in State v. Adamcik, 152
Idaho 445,476, 272 P.3d 417,448 (2012).
There can be no question that, in this case, Hall "caused or played an
important role in prompting the trial court to give" the pattern instructions on selfdefense.

During the jury instruction conference, Hall's counsel specifically asked

the court to give not only Hall's proposed justifiable homicide and excusable
homicide instructions, but also to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense. (See
Tr., Vol. 2, p.2505, Ls.9-11 (trial counsel asking the court to "give excusable and
justifiable and a self-defense instruction" (emphasis added).) Then, when asked by
the trial court why it should give both a justifiable homicide instruction and a selfdefense instruction, Hall's counsel conceded that justifiable homicide was covered
by the court's instruction on self-defense. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2505, L.12 - p.2506, L.16.)
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Having specifically asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense,
and having acquiesced in the giving of the pattern self-defense instructions in lieu of
instructions on both justifiable homicide and self-defense, Hall cannot be heard to
complain on appeal that the trial court erred in so instructing the jury. Dunlap, 155
Idaho at 379, 313 P.3d at 35; Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 476, 272 P.3d at 448; Blake,
133 Idaho at 240, 985 P.2d at 120.

C.

Even If Hall Did Not Invite The Giving Of The Self-Defense Instructions, He
Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Demonstrating The Giving Of Those
Instructions Constituted Fundamental Error
Even if Hall did not invite the giving of the pattern self-defense instructions,

this Court should decline to consider Hall's claim that the trial court erred by giving
those instructions; Hall did not preserve the issue by way of objection below, nor has
he demonstrated that the giving of the instructions constituted fundamental error.
When a defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, an appellate court will
only review the instruction for fundamental error. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 472, 272
P.3d at 444 (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008);
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010)).

To prove

fundamental error, the defendant must demonstrate: "(1) the alleged error violated
an unwaived constitutional right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the
alleged error was not harmless." 19..:. at 473, 272 P.3d at 445 (citing Perry, 150 Idaho
at 228, 245 P.3d at 980). For the reasons that follow, Hall cannot carry his burden
of demonstrating that the challenged instructions were erroneous at all, much less
that they plainly violated an unwaived constitutional right or affected the outcome of
the trial.
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"Before [this Court] consider[s] whether there was fundamental error, [it] must
first determine whether the trial court erred at all." Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 473, 272
P.3d at 445 (citing Johnson, 145 Idaho at 977, 188 P.3d at 919). Hall argues the
pattern self-defense instructions were erroneous because they "incorrectly state[d]
Idaho's justifiable homicide law." (Appellant's brief, p.32.) Specifically, he contends
the instructions imposed requirements, not explicitly set forth in I.C. §§ 18-4009 and
18-4010, that, in order for the homicide to be justifiable (1) Hall must have believed
that his actions were necessary to save him from the danger presented, and (2) the
amount of force Hall used did not exceed the amount of force a reasonable person
in the same situation would believe to be necessary. (Appellant's brief, pp.29-32.)
Hall's argument fails for all of the reasons already set forth in Section I.D., supra,
which the state incorporates here by reference.

But, more importantly, Hall's

argument is irrelevant. Whether the self-defense instructions did or did not correctly
state the law of justifiable homicide as set forth in I. C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 has
no bearing on whether those instructions accurately stated the law of self-defense.
Hall's attempt to conflate the trial court's refusal to give a specific justifiable
homicide instruction with its decision to give the pattern instructions on self-defense
that were both requested by Hall and supported by the evidence should be rejected.
Even if Hall could demonstrate error in the challenged jury instructions, he
cannot meet his burden under the first prong of Perry of establishing the alleged
errors violated an unwaived constitutional right. Hall contends the alleged errors in
the self-defense instructions lowered the state's burden of proof and, therefore,
violated his rights under the Due Process clauses of the United States and Idaho
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constitutions. (Appellant's brief, pp.32-35.) Hall's argument is unavailing because,
contrary to his assertions, the state had no constitutional obligation to disprove his
affirmative defense.
Due Process demands that a jury find "beyond a reasonable doubt ... every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Martin v. Ohio, 480
U.S. 228, 231-32 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). "[T]he
State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury instruction violates due
process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576,
588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) (citation omitted); Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433,
437 (2004 ).

However, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution

does not require the state to disprove a defendant's affirmative defense. Martin,
480 U.S. at 236. A requirement that the state "assume[] the burden of disproving
affirmative defenses" is a matter of state law; states that place the burden on
defendants to prove an affirmative defense are not "in violation of the Constitution."
~

(citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977)). Because the state had

no burden under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution to
disprove Hall's self-defense claim, Hall's assertion on appeal that the self-defense
instructions were erroneous, even if true, does not establish a violation of his
constitutional rights. 7

7

Although Hall cites Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution as supporting his claim
of a due process violation (see Appellant's brief, p.32), he offers no argument why
that provision should be interpreted any differently than its federal counterpart. See
State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 406-07, 825 P.2d 501, 503-04 (1992) (declining
to consider whether Idaho Constitution afforded greater protection than U.S.
Constitution absent supporting argument).
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Nor has Hall shown that the alleged error "plainly exists" as required under
the second prong of Perry. To establish this prong, Hall must demonstrate that the
alleged error in the giving of the self-defense instructions is "clear or obvious" on the
existing record, "without any need for additional information" including information
"as to whether the failure to object" to the allegedly erroneous instructions "was a
tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Here, the record

shows trial counsel did not merely fail to object to the challenge instructions; she
actually requested that they be given. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2505, Ls.9-11; see also p.2506,
Ls.14-15 (conceding self-defense instructions covered justifiable homicide).) That
Hall now believes trial counsel made a poor tactical decision does not establish plain
error.
The self-defense instructions the trial court gave are the pattern instructions
on "Self-Defense" and "Self-Defense - Reasonable Force." (Compare R., pp.151921 with ICJI 1517 and 1518). While the Idaho Supreme Court has also approved a
specific "Justifiable Homicide Defense" instruction, see ICJI 1514, both the language
of the pattern "Self-Defense" instruction and the comments thereto make clear that
that instruction is also based on I.C. §§ 18-4009 and 18-4010 and is approved for
use in homicide cases.

See ICJI 1517 ("A [homicide] [battery] is justifiable if the

defendant was acting in [self-defense]" (brackets in original)); ICJI 1517 comments
(citing, e.g., I.C. §§ 18-4009, 18-4010, 18-4013 and stating, "This instruction may be
modified by the appropriate selection of bracketed language ... for use in either
homicide or battery cases.")); see also State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329 n.6,
986 P.2d 346, 352 n.6 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting language of ICJI 1517 "provides for
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inclusion of the term 'death or great bodily harm' or only 'bodily harm,' depending
upon whether the prosecution is for homicide or for battery"). In light of the fact that
trial counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense and
that the instructions the court actually gave have been approved by the Idaho
Supreme Court for use in homicide cases, Hall cannot demonstrate that the trial
court plainly erred by giving those instructions.
Finally, Hall cannot meet his burden under the third prong of Perry of
establishing the error he alleges was anything but harmless. For the same reasons
articulated in the harmless error analysis set forth in Section I.E., supra, and
incorporated here by reference, if the trial court erred in giving the pattern selfdefense instructions requested by Hall, there simply is no reasonable possibility that
such error actually affected the outcome of the trial.

111.
Hall Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Excluding
Emmett's Facebook Posts
A.

Introduction
Hall moved to introduce "[e]vidence that on February 25, 2011 and March 10,

2011, [Emmett] Corrigan made statements on Facebook indicating his desire to fight
a male whom Corrigan had an altercation with on or about the middle of February
2011,

and

indicating

that

apprehension in the male."

Corrigan's

physical

(R., pp.1775, 1778.)

presence

caused

fear and

Specifically, Hall sought to

introduce the following statements, posted by Emmett on his Facebook page in
February and March 2011:
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•

Nothin better than having someone try and call you out and
when it comes go time they end up pissing their pants and not
wanting any part of what they started
(posted February 25 at 4:36 a.m.J

•

Mine happened last week. Apparently they talk talk talk smack
in Cali. Here it [sic] Idaho talk is cheap. Throwin down settles it
once and for all!!
[posted February 25 at 4:41 a.m.]

•

"Amen" Brotha. I do have Cali buddies who are tough as nails
(yeah you DC) but they treat women with respect. Abuse a
woman like my guy does and I will come to your house! Once
he has someone his own size he doesn't feel like being violent
anymore!
[posted February 25 at 4:58 a.m.]

•

So sad seeing people get manipulated by people who abuse, lie
and cheat ...
[posted March 7 at 8:59 p.m.]

•

I would kick their ass, but they are too scared to throw down ...
LOL!!!l Next time I'll film it for ya!!
[posted March 10 at 9: 19 a.m.]

(R., pp.1178, 1812; Sealed Exhibits, pp.74, 115.)
Hall argued the proffered Facebook posts were relevant and admissible
under the I.R.E. 803(3) "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule to establish
Emmett was the first aggressor on the night Hall shot him and to demonstrate
Emmett's intent, at the time he made the statements, to "engage in a future act of
aggression in a confrontation with Mr. Hall." (R., pp.611-14; see also R., pp.72830.)

The state opposed the motion, arguing "[n]one of Mr. Corrigan's Facebook

statements reflect his state of mind on the date the statements were made, much
less on the date of his murder." (R., p.529.) The state also argued that, even if the
Facebook statements fell within the I.R.E. 803(3) exception to the hearsay rule, they
should nevertheless be excluded under I.RE. 403 because whatever limited
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probative value the statements may have had was "substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice from the jury concluding Mr. Corrigan 'got what he
deserved' because he engages in puffery on Facebook." (R., p.530.)
After considering the parties' briefing, the district court denied Hall's motion to
introduce Emmett's Facebook posts, reasoning: "This email [sic] does not specify
who the 'male' is that Corrigan is referring to and is highly speculative that this
desire [to fight a "male"] pertained to the Defendant. Therefore this evidence will not
be admitted because it is both hearsay evidence and irrelevant pursuant to I.R.E.
403." (R., p.1121.)
Hall challenges the district court's evidentiary ruling, arguing as he did below
that "the Facebook statements should have been admitted because they fit under
the 'state of mind' exception to the hearsay rule and were relevant because they had
a tendency to make it more probable that Mr. Corrigan was the first aggressor."
(Appellant's brief, p.37.) He also challenges the trial court's determination that the
probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice.

(Appellant's brief, pp.43-45.)

Hall's arguments fail.

Correct

application of the law to the facts of this case supports the district court's
discretionary decision to exclude the Facebook statements on the bases that the
statements were irrelevant hearsay and otherwise unfairly prejudicial.

Even

assuming the court erred in excluding the Facebook statements, a review of the
record shows such error did not affect the jury's verdict in this case and was
therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for

an abuse of discretion.

State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187

(2009) (citations omitted). Whether evidence is relevant, however, is a question of
law reviewed de nova. State v. Thomas, 2015 WL 300944 *3 (Idaho, Jan. 23, 2015)
(citing State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014)); State v.
Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (201 O); State v. Meister, 148
Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055 (2009).
In reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court "examine[s] whether:
(1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court
acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal standards;
and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Grist, 147
Idaho at 51, 205 P.3d at 1187 (citations omitted); accord Shackelford, 150 Idaho at
363, 247 P.3d at 590. "However, an abuse of discretion may be deemed harmless if
a substantial right is not affected.

In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding

evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial
right of one of the parties." Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).

C.

The District Court Correctly Excluded Emmett's Facebook Statements On
The Bases That The Statements Were Irrelevant Hearsay And Otherwise
Unfairly Preiudicial
Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the matter asserted

and, unless specifically excepted by the rules of evidence, is not admissible at trial.
I.RE. 801 (c), 802. Hall sought to introduce Emmett's Facebook statements under
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the I.RE. 803(3) "state of mind" exception to the hearsay rule. That rule provides
that, regardless of the availability of the declarant as a witness, the following is not
excluded by the hearsay rule:
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental felling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.
I.RE. 803(3).

Although application of I.R.E. 803(3) does not depend on the

availability of the declarant, the Idaho Supreme Court has cautioned that "[l]imited
circumstances exist in which statements made by a murder victim to a third party
are admissible under" the rule. State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364, 24 7 P.3d
582, 591 (2010) (citing State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 382, 630 P.2d 665, 669
(1981) (footnoted omitted)).

Specifically, such "statements may be admitted only

after a determination that (1) the declaration is relevant, and (2) the need for and
value of such testimony outweighs the possibility of prejudice .... " lg_,_ (citing Garcia,
102 Idaho at 382, 630 P.2d at 669). Because, for the reasons set forth below, the
proffered Facebook statements met neither of these prerequisites for admissibility
under I.RE. 803(3), the trial court correctly excluded them.

1.

The Proffered Statements Were Not Relevant To Hall's Self-Defense
Claim

"Evidence is relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."' Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364,
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247 P.3d at 591 (quoting I.RE. 401) (additional citation omitted). "Whether a fact is
'of consequence' or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties."

kl

(citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444, 180

P.3d 476, 483 (2008)).
In a homicide case, a statement made by the victim reflecting the victim's
state of mind "may be admissible when the 'declarant-victim's state of mind is
relevant to an issue involved in the criminal proceedings."'

kl

(quoting State v.

Goodrich, 97 Idaho 472, 477, 546 P.2d 1180, 1185 (1976)); see also State v.
Radabaugh, 93 Idaho 727, 731, 471 P.2d 582, 586 (1970).

Thus, for example,

evidence of a deceased victim's statements to a third party that he or she feared the
defendant are admissible to rebut a defense theory of self-defense. Garcia, 102
Idaho at 382, 630 P.2d at 669 (quoting Goodrich, 97 Idaho at 477 n.7, 546 P.2d at
1185 n. 7) (where defendant claims self-defense, "a defendant's contention that the
deceased attacked him first, may be rebutted by extra-judicial declarations of the
victim that he was afraid of the defendant, thus rendering it unlikely that the
deceased was the aggressor in the first instance"). Likewise, it is widely accepted
that, when a homicide defendant relies on a theory of self-defense, "evidence of the
deceased's uncommunicated threats against the defendant is generally admissible
as tending to show who was the aggressor."

40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide § 308

(database updated February 2015) (and cases cited therein); accord Annotation:
Admissibility of Uncommunicated Threats on Issue of Self-Defense in Prosecution
for Homicide, 98 A.L.R.2d 6 (1964); State v. Barber, 13 Idaho 65, 88 P. 418, 423-24
(1907) (in homicide case where defendant claims self-defense, uncommunicated
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threats made by victim against defendant are relevant "as tending to show the
feelings and intents of deceased towards the defendant at the time of their
encounter and whether or not the deceased was the first assailant" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
Hall argues Emmett's February and March 2011 Facebook statements should
have been admitted under the I.RE. 803(3) "state of mind" exception to the hearsay
rule because, according to Hall, the statements evidenced Emmett's intent, at the
time he made the statements, to be the aggressor in a future confrontation with Hall
and were, therefore, relevant to establish that Emmett was the first aggressor on the
night Hall shot him.

(Appellant's brief, pp.39-43.)

Had the proffered Facebook

statements actually reflected any intent by Emmett to injure Hall or to engage him in
a future confrontation, such threats, even though uncommunicated to Hall himself,
would likely have been admissible under I.RE. 803(3) as relevant to Hall's claim
that Emmett was the first aggressor in the confrontation that ended in Emmett's
death. 8

As found by the district court, however, the proffered statements were

neither relevant nor admissible for this purpose because none of the statements
even mention Hall, much less evidence any then existing intent by Emmett to be the
aggressor against Hall in a future confrontation.

8

This Court has never explicitly held statements reflecting an existing intent to
engage in a future act are admissible under I.RE. 803(3). However, because "this
Court adopted the Idaho Rules of Evidence in order to obtain uniformity in the trial
practice in both state and federal courts," State v. Cannady, 137 Idaho 67, 70, 44
P.3d 1122, 1125 (2002) (citing Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275, 723
P.2d 814, 819 (1986)), and because, as Hall correctly points out (Appellant's brief,
pp.39-42), the Federal Rules of Evidence make such statements admissible, the
state assumes this Court would also deem such statements admissible under I.RE.
803(3).
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Indeed, most of the Facebook statements Hall sought to introduce appear to
reflect Emmett's opinions and beliefs - not his then existing intent - about some
past confrontation he had with an unidentified "guy." (See R., p.1812 and Sealed

Exhibits, p.115 ("Nothing better than having someone try and call you out and when
it comes go time they end up pissing their pants and not wanting any part of what
they started"; "Mine happened last week. Apparently they talk talk talk smack in
Cali. Here it [sic] Idaho talk is cheap. Throwing down settles it once and for all!!";
"So sad seeing people get manipulated by people who abuse, lie and cheat ... ").)
The two remaining statements - "Abuse a woman like my guy does and I will come
to your house! Once he has someone his own size he doesn't feel like being violent
anymore!" and "I would kick their ass, but they are too scared to throw down ... Next
time I'll film it for ya!!" (R., p.1812; Sealed Exhibits, p.115) - likewise do not appear
to evince any intent or plan on Emmett's part to go after the unidentified "guy" in the
future.

Rather, the statements appear in context to again be referring to a past

occurrence in which the "guy" referred to was "too scared to throw down" and did not
"feel like being violent anymore" when Emmett came to his house. Even Emmett's
statement, "[n]ext time I'll film it for ya!!," does not reflect that he was planning on
creating a "next time," only that if and when there was a next time, he would "film it."
Even if some of the proffered Facebook statements could be construed as
evidencing Emmett's then existing intent to engage in a future confrontation, the
statements were not relevant to Hall's self-defense claim because none of the
statements indicate that Hall was the "guy" Emmett intended to confront. In arguing
otherwise, Hall points to the following statements as definitively establishing that he
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was the subject of Emmett's Facebook posts: "Mine happened last week"; "Abuse a
woman like my guy does"; and "So sad seeing people get manipulated by people
who abuse, lie and cheat ... " (Appellant's brief, p.43.) Hall posits that, because
Emmett and Hall had a verbal confrontation at Hall's house in late February, and
because Emmett believed Hall was abusive to Kandi, the unidentified "guy" Emmett
referred to in the Facebook posts necessarily must have been Hall. (Id. (transcript
citations omitted).) In addition to being founded entirely on statements that do not
themselves reflect any relevant "state of mind" for purposes of admissibility under
I.R.E. 803(3), Hall's argument in this regard rests on the basest of supposition that
he was the only "guy" to whom Emmett could have been referring. Such supposition
not only finds no support in the evidence, it is also directly contrary to Hall's
overarching theory at trial that Emmett was a "pumped up," steroidal bully who liked
to get in fights, generally. (See,~. Tr., Vol. 1, p.920, Ls.1-23, p.939, L.19-p.941,
L.7, p.1248, Ls.6-13, p.1251, L.22 - p.1252, L.12, p.1271, L.17 - p.1272, L.11,
p.1349, Ls.22-25; Tr., Vol. 2, p.2590, L.17 - p.2591, L.19.) Because there is no
indication that Emmett's Facebook statements actually related to Hall, and not some
other unidentified "guy" with whom Emmett had fought or desired to fight, such
statements were not relevant for the proffered purpose of demonstrating Emmett's
intent to be the aggressor in a future confrontation with Hall. See Barber, 13 Idaho
at _ , 88 P. at 424 (quoting from another case 9 language indicating that, where

The Court in Barber indicated it was quoting from Babcock v. People, 22 P. 817
(Colo. 1889). See Barber, 13 Idaho at _ , 88 P. at 424. The quoted language
does not appear in the Babcock opinion, however; instead, it appears in People v.
Farley, 57 P. 571, 572 (Cal. 1899).
9
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deceased victim's threats did not appear to have related to the defendant, such
were not relevant to establish "'who commenced the deadly affray"'). The district
court thus correctly excluded the statements on the ground that they were not
relevant.

2.

Even If Relevant, The Need For And Value Of The Facebook
Statements Was Substantially Outweighed By The Danger Of Unfair
Prejudice

Even if the proffered Facebook statements were relevant to Hall's claim that
Emmett was the first aggressor on the night Hall shot and killed him, the district
court correctly excluded the statements pursuant to I.RE. 403. (See R., p.1121.)
Under that rule, even relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." I.R.E. 403. "As with the
admissibility of any piece of evidence, where the probative value of [a] statement
[offered to show the state of mind of a declarant victim] is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice ... , this evidence should be excluded." Goodrich,
97 Idaho at 477, 546 P.2d at 1185.

Stated differently, such statements, even if

relevant, may be admitted only if "the need for and value of such [evidence]
outweighs the possibility of prejudice." Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 364, 247 P.3d at
591 (citing Garcia, 102 Idaho at 382, 630 P.2d at 669).
Although Hall argues otherwise, the need for and value of the proffered
Facebook statements to support Hall's claim that Emmett was the first aggressor in
the confrontation that resulted in his death was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. As set forth above, it is far from clear that the Facebook
statements even related to Hall. Given this uncertainty, any probative value of the
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statements as reflecting Emmett's intent to engage Hall in some future confrontation
was minimal, at best.

The probative value of the Facebook statements is further

diluted when viewed in light of other evidence in the case, which indicated that,
while Emmett was willing to engage in verbal sparring with Hall, he never physically
assaulted Hall, including on the occasion he went to Hall's house in February. (Tr.,
Vol. 1, p.844, L.14 - p.856, L.24, p.1240, L.17 - p.1244, L.7.) Finally, Hall did not
"need" the Facebook statements

to

support his claim that Emmett was the first

aggressor because there was ample other evidence presented that demonstrated
Emmett disliked Hall and threatened to injure him if he ever harmed Kandi. (See,
~ . Tr., Vol. 1, p.905, Ls.15-18, p.943, L.22 - p.945, L.13, p.950, Ls.21-23, p.955,
L.20 - p.956, L.21, p.1244, L.8 - p.1245, L.1; State's Exhibit 77A.)
Compared to the minimal "need for and value of" the Facebook statements to
support Hall's claim that Emmett was the first aggressor, the potential prejudicial
effect of the evidence was extremely high. That the jury would have had to engage
in speculation to conclude that Hall was the subject of the Facebook posts is itself
prejudicial.

Cf., State v. Schneider, 129 Idaho 59, 921 P.2d 759 (Ct. App. 1996)

("expert's opinion ... that is speculative or conclusory has little or no probative value
and may be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or misleading the jury" (citation
omitted)).

Adding

to

that prejudice is, as the state argued below, the very real

possibility that the jury may have concluded Emmett '"got what he deserved'
because he engage[d] in puffery on Facebook." (R., p.530.)
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While it is true, as Hall suggests, that the trial court could have instructed the
jury to consider the Facebook statements for the limited purpose of showing
Emmett's "attitude of mind ... towards [Mr. Hall]" (see Appellant's brief, p.44 (internal
quotations and citations omitted, brackets original)), such an instruction would have
actually amplified, not minimized, the danger of unfair prejudice because, again, it is
speculative that the proffered statements were directed at or related to Hall.

An

instruction directing the jury to consider the statements as evidence of Emmett's
feelings of hostility towards Hall, when it is not even apparent that the statements
related to Hall, and where Emmett was not available to explain his actual intent in
making the statements, would have only had the potential to mislead the jury, not
ameliorate the danger of unfair prejudice associated with admitting the otherwise
minimally relevant evidence. The district court correctly exercised its discretion in
excluding the Facebook statements under I.RE. 403.
For all of the reasons set forth above, the trial court correctly determined that
the proffered Facebook statements were irrelevant or, alternatively, that any
probative value of the statements was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice from their admission.

Because the statements were irrelevant

and/or unfairly prejudicial, Hall has failed to show the court abused its discretion in
denying his motion to admit the statements under I.RE. 803(3).

D.

If The Trial Court Erred In Excluding The Proffered Facebook Statements,
Such Error Was Harmless
Even if this Court concludes the trial court erred by excluding the proffered

Facebook statements, reversal is not warranted. The rules of evidence expressly
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provide that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes
evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." I.RE. 103(a); see also
I.C.R. 52 ("Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect
substantial rights shall be disregarded."). Consistent with this evidentiary rule, the
appellate courts of this state will grant relief from an incorrect ruling regarding the
admissibility of evidence "only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the
parties." Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d 582 at 590 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). An erroneous evidentiary ruling that does not affect a
substantial right is necessarily harmless.

kl

Contrary to Hall's assertions on

appeal, a review of the record in this case clearly shows that, if the trial court erred
in excluding the proffered Facebook statements, such error did not affect Hall's
substantial rights and was therefore harmless.
The proffered purpose of Facebook statements was to show that Emmett
was the first aggressor in the confrontation that resulted in his death. Even if the
statements were relevant and admissible for this purpose, Hall was not prejudiced
by their exclusion from evidence at trial. The Facebook statements were, at best,
cumulative of other evidence that more directly tended to demonstrate Emmett's
animosity towards Hall. (See, ~ ' Tr., Vol. 1, p.905, Ls.15-18 (Emmett "intensely
disliked" Hall), p.943, L.22 - p.945, L.13 (Emmett was angry when Hall called Kandi
and threatened to "crack his fucking head"), p.950, Ls.21-23 (Emmett "seemed
eager to have a confrontation" with Hall), p.955, L.20 - p.956, L.21 (Emmett
"rammed" Hall in the chest), p.1244, L.8 - p.1245, L.1 (Emmett told coworker "he
would have no problem hurting [Hall] the way that [Hall] hurt Kandi"); State's Exhibit
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77A (Emmett texted Kand i's sister on night of shooting and told her he was ready to
drive to Hall's house and "beat his ass").)

Having rejected this evidence as

establishing that Emmett was the first aggressor, and having otherwise been
presented with overwhelming evidence that Hall acted with malice aforethought and
without any legal justification when he shot Emmett in the chest and in the head,
see Section I.E., supra, incorporated here by reference, there is no reasonable
possibility that, had the Facebook statements been admitted, the jury would have
reached a different verdict. Any error in the exclusion of the Facebook statements
was harmless and did not affect Hall's substantial rights.

IV.

Hall Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By Permitting Mr.
Toluse To Testify Regarding The Specific Instruction Hall Received During His
Concealed Weapon Carry Class
A.

Introduction
Joseph Toluse is a certified "Use of Deadly Force instructor" who taught the

"concealed carry class" Hall was required to complete in order to obtain a concealed
weapons permit. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1884, L.15 - p.1886, L.10, p.1888, L.11 - p.1889,
L.10, p.2106, L.1-p.2107, L.25, p.2110, L.8-p.2114, L.17.) After Hall's counsel
elicited testimony from several of the state's witnesses that Hall regularly carried a
firearm and had a concealed weapons permit that allowed him to do so, (see Tr.,
Vol.1, p.927, L.5-p.929, L.5, p.1044, L.5-p.1045, L.10, p.1333, L.19-p.1335,
L.4, p.1345, Ls.17-20), and after the state introduced the concealed weapons
license that was recovered from Hall's wallet on the night of Emmett's death (see
State's Exhibit 92), the state called Mr. Toluse to testify regarding what he taught
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Hall in his concealed carry class (see Tr., Vol. 2, p.1912, L.2 - p.1915, L.8 (state's
offer of proof regarding the anticipated substance of Mr. Toluse's testimony)).
Hall moved to exclude Mr. Toluse's testimony arguing, inter alia, that what Mr.
Toluse taught in the concealed carry class Hall took in November 2006 was not
relevant to Hall's actions and intent during the March 11, 2011 confrontation that
resulted in Emmett's death, and that there was a danger the jury might view Mr.
Toluse's testimony as tantamount to an instruction on the legal requirements of selfdefense.10 (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1911, L.13- p.1912, L.1, p.1916, L.7-p.1919, L.2.) The
court overruled Hall's relevance objection, finding Hall's "knowledge and experience
with a weapon is a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action."
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.192O, L.14 - p.1921, L.5.) The court also declined to exclude the
testimony under I.R.E. 403, reasoning:
As I see it, I concur with the state. It's come out that [Hall] had
this weapon; he had a concealed weapons permit. What sort of
training he received regarding that to get that permit, because that's
been admitted, the concealed weapons permit, is relevant.
I'm not going to let this witness testify as to the law of selfdefense. He can certainly say that we discussed various statutes, this
is what I taught them, that Mr. Hall received a certification.

10 Hall initially moved to exclude Mr. Toluse's testimony for lack of sufficient
foundation. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1886, L.11 - p.1887, L.1O, p.189O, L.24 - p.1891, L.1.)
Because Mr. Toluse had no independent recollection of having taught Hall, the trial
court sustained Hall's objection and excluded Mr. Toluse's testimony until such time
as the state could present evidence demonstrating Hall actually attended Mr.
Toluse's concealed carry class. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1889, L.22 - p.189O, L.23, p. 1891,
Ls.7-9.) The state subsequently laid that foundation through a different witness (see
Tr., Vol. 2, p.21O5, L.1-p.21O9, L.7), afterwhich Mr. Tolusewaspermittedtotestify
(see generally Tr., Vol. 2, pp.211O-2132).
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But whether or not Mr. Hall absorbed all of what he was taught
or not is not the issue. The issue is: Was this presented to him at a
point in time.
And I don't find that it's remote to the extent that this is
something he may have learned in hunter safety class when he [was]
15. This was within about five years of this incident. And I don't think
that that's so remote in time that - and the information is outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.1921, L.11 - p.1922, L.10.)

Having determined the proffered

testimony was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial, the trial court denied Hall's
motion to exclude Mr. Toluse as a witness. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.1922, Ls.11-20.)
After the state laid sufficient foundation, the trial court permitted Mr. Toluse to
testify about what he taught in his concealed carry class. (See generally Tr., Vol. 2,
pp.2110-32.)

In doing so, however, the court gave the jury the following limiting

instruction:
Mr. Toluse is here to testify regarding instruction that he gave
on the dates in question. That's a limited purpose of his testimony, is
what he instructed upon.
Issues such as self-defense or use of force, the court, at the
end of the trial if appropriate, will give you detailed instructions on
those subjects. So do not consider this evidence other than the limited
purpose for which it is being admitted, and that was what the
instruction was.
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.2123, Ls.9-23.)
As he did below, Hall argues on appeal that Mr. Toluse's testimony about
what he taught in his concealed carry class was not relevant and, therefore, the trial
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court erred by admitting it. 11

(Appellant's brief, pp.46-53.)

Hall's argument fails.

The trial court correctly determined the testimony regarding Hall's firearm training
was relevant as bearing on the issue of Hall's intent on the night he shot and killed
Emmett. Even assuming the testimony was not relevant for this purpose, any error
in its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether evidence is relevant is a question of law reviewed de nova. State v.

Thomas, 2015 WL 300944 *3 (Idaho, Jan. 23, 2015) (citing State v. Russo, 157
Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d 232, 241 (2014)); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,
363, 247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010); State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236, 220 P.3d 1055
(2009).

C.

Mr. Toluse's Testimony Was Relevant To The Issue Of Hall's Intent
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact

that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." I.RE. 401. "Whether a fact is 'of
consequence' or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories
presented by the parties." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 364, 247 P.3d 582,
591 (2010) (citing State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437,444, 180 P.3d 476,483 (2008));
accord State v. Koch, 157 Idaho 89, 334 P.3d 280, 291-292 (2014).

11

Hall does not expressly challenge the trial court's discretionary determination
under I.R.E. 403 that the probative value of Mr. Toluse's testimony was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (But see Appellant's
brief, p.51 (referencing I.RE. 403 in harmless error analysis).)
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The state's theory in this case was that Hall not only intentionally shot and
killed Emmett, but that he did so with premeditation, as evidenced at least in part by
the fact that Hall had a loaded, unholstered firearm in his pocket when he
confronted Emmett in the Walgreens parking lot.

(See Tr., Vol. 1, p.371, L.21 -

p.376, L.15; Tr., Vol. 2, p.2554, L.25 - p.2578, L.21, p.2608, L.24 - p.2612, L.14.)
Hall's theory, on the other hand, was essentially twofold: (1) the fact that Hall had a
loaded firearm in his pocket was neither unusual nor unlawful because he had a
concealed weapons license that permitted him to carry a gun, and (2) if he shot
Emmett, he did so either accidentally or in self-defense. (See Tr., Vol. 2, p.2579,
L.13 - p.2608, L.20.)

Although Hall argues otherwise, a review of Mr. Toluse's

testimony regarding the training Hall received in his concealed carry class, in light of
other evidence presented in the case, shows that testimony was directly relevant to
the disputed issue of Hall's intent.
Mr. Toluse testified to having instructed Hall on the following principles during
his concealed carry class:
•

Before resorting to deadly force in self-defense, all three
elements of the "AOJ triad" should be present:
(1) "the
aggressor has the ability to cause death or great bodily harm";
(2) the aggressor has the "opportunity'' or "power to immediately
employ the ability with a firearm"; and (3) the defender must
reasonably believe that he or she is in "jeopardy'' of being
"kill[ed] or cripple[d]." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2115, L.16 - p.2118, L.1
(emphases added).)

•

If shooting the aggressor is necessary for self-defense, "the
initial charges should be shot at center of mass" - i.e., the
"chest area." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2118, Ls.2-11.)

•

The "21-foot rule":
A person "can cover 21 feet in ...
approximately 1.5 seconds"; therefore, "if a person with a
contact-type weapon" - e.g., a bludgeoning instrument, a knife,
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or even bare hands - "is within this 21-foot distance ... , then the
defender is actually in a position of deadly force." (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2118, L.12-p.2119, L.10.)
•

"[A] firearm should never be used as a scare tactic" and "should
never be presented unless you're actually justified in using that
firearm in self-defense." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2119, Ls.11-17.)

•

A "firearm should always be carried in some type of a holster,"

and the holster "should cover the trigger guard on the firearm."
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.2119, Ls.18-24, p.2124, L.22-p.2125, L.1.)
•

"The only time" the gun should be taken out of the holster and
"present[ed]" is "if you are legally justified in using the firearm in
self-defense." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2125, Ls.11-20.)

•

You should not carry a firearm "if you are under the influence of
any drug or any alcohol." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.21 - p.2126, L.2.)

•

The "SAFE principle": "S stands for secure yourself from the
threat, A is avoid the threat, F is flee from the threat, and E is if
you must, you have to engage the threat." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2126,
Ls.3-9.) "You should secure yourself from the threat. You
should do everything that you can to not get involved in a
situation where you would be put in a position where you have
to use deadly force." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2126, Ls.21-25.) "If you can
avoid the threat, if you see something that is a potential threat,
then you should avoid it." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2127, Ls.1-3.)

•

"[Y]ou should keep your finger off the trigger and outside the
trigger guard until your muscle is on target and you are
prepared to shoot." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2128, L.18-p.2129, L.1.)

Mr. Toluse also testified that, in addition to teaching all of the above principles, he
also provides the students in his concealed carry class with "the same handout that
the sheriff's office gives to ... the applicants when they apply for their [concealed
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weapons] permit" and with information about Idaho law12 as it relates to the subjects
he teaches in the class. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2128, Ls.4-17.)
In short, Mr. Toluse testified that, before he received his concealed weapons
permit, Hall received instruction on how to safely carry and operate a firearm, on
both the recommended and legal circumstances in which the use of firearm would
be justified in self-defense and, if possible, to avoid a confrontation in which the use
of self-defense would be required. However, other evidence presented in the case
showed that on the night Hall confronted Emmett in the Walgreens parking lot, Hall
neither avoided a known potential confrontation, nor carried and operated his
firearm in the safe manner he had been instructed.

For instance, the evidence

showed that, although Hall was aware Emmett was on his way to Walgreens and
had threatened to "fucking crack" Hall's "head," Hall made no effort to avoid that
potential threat but instead waited for Emmett in the Walgreens parking lot and
immediately approached him when he arrived. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.873, L.7 - p.875, L.8,
p.877, L.15 - p.878, L.15.) Nor did Hall follow Mr. Toluse's instruction to always
carry his gun in a holster and not remove it unless he was justified in using the
firearm in self-defense. To the contrary, the evidence showed that, although Hall
had a holster for the gun, he left that holster in his vehicle and approached Emmett
with the loaded, unholstered gun in his sweatshirt pocket. (Tr., Vol. 1, p.877, L.4 p.878, L.15, p.1095, L.8 - p.1098, L.24, p.1373, Ls.1-10, p.1448, Ls.9-15.) Finally,
the evidence showed that, contrary to Mr. Toluse's instruction to not carry a firearm

12

Mr. Toluse did not testify as to what the requirements of Idaho law are, only that
Hall would have received instruction on those legal requirements. (Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2128, Ls.12-17.)
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"if you are under the influence of any drug or any alcohol," Hall had been drinking on
the night he shot Emmett and also had prescription drugs in his system. (Tr., Vol. 1,
p.867, L.21 - p.869, L.5, p.1327, L.15 - p.1329, L.15; Tr., Vol. 2, p.1948, L.3 p.1956, L.6; State's Exhibit 135.)
In light of the above evidence, there can be no question that Mr. Toluse's
testimony was relevant; the fact that Hall was instructed on certain methods of
carrying and using a firearm to avoid accidental or intentional shootings but failed to
comply with those methods on the night he confronted Emmett in the Walgreens
parking lot made it more probable that Hall intended to use the firearm against
Emmett and that his doing so was neither an accident nor self-defense. Because
Mr. Toluse's testimony also established that Hall was instructed on the legal
requirements of self-defense, it was also evidence from which the jury could
conclude that Hall not only intended to shoot and kill Emmett in the Walgreens
parking lot but that he intended to do so in a manner that would make it look like he
acted in self-defense. 13 The testimony was relevant and the district court did not err
by admitting it.

D.

If The Trial Court Erred In Admitting Mr. Toluse's Testimony, The Error Was
Harmless
Even if Mr. Toluse's testimony was not relevant, any error in the admission of

Kandi initially told police the cadence of the gunshots she heard was "pop pop, a
pause, and then pop." (Tr., Vol. 1, p.1015, L.20 - p.1016, L.4, p.1187, L.24 p.1188, L.10, p.1393, Ls.4-24.) As noted by the prosecutor in closing argument,
"that sequence of shots is consistent with the defendant firing two execution shots
on Corrigan" and then "turn[ing] and firing it on himself." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2572, Ls.1019.)
13

60

that testimony was harmless and did not affect Hall's substantial rights. See I.R.E.
103(a); LC.R. 52; Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d 582 at 59.

For the

reasons set forth in Section I. E, supra, and incorporated here by reference, even
without Mr. Toluse's testimony, the evidence presented at trial overwhelmingly
established that Hall acted with malice aforethought, and without legal justification,
when he shot and killed Emmett in the Walgreens parking lot. Thus, had Mr. Toluse
not been permitted to testify regarding the training Hall received before obtaining a
concealed weapons permit, the jury would still have found Hall guilty of second
degree murder.
In arguing that the state cannot meet its burden of demonstrating the
admission of Mr. Toluse's testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, Hall
points out that Mr. Toluse's testimony was not the subject of proper expert opinion
regarding whether, on the night in question, Hall had an objectively reasonable fear
of Emmett. (Appellant's brief, pp.50-51.) Hall's argument is irrelevant. The state
did not proffer Mr. Toluse as an expert at all, much less proffer his "testimony as
expert testimony to inform the jury's determination as to whether Mr. Hall had an
objectively reasonable fear." (Id., p.51.) Nor is there any indication the jury would
have construed Mr. Toluse's testimony as bearing on the objective reasonableness
of Hall's fear of Emmett, even if it found Hall actually had such fear.
A review of Mr. Toluse's testimony clearly shows it related only to the
subjects he taught in his concealed carry class; he did not purport to have any
knowledge of the actual circumstances that led to Emmett's death. (See Tr., Vol. 2,
p.2114, L.18 - p.2119, L.25, p.2124, L.1 - p.2129, L.12.) In fact, when questioned
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by Hall's trial counsel whether he taught what the response should be when a
person with a concealed weapons permit who "is carrying the gun in his pocket or in
his hoodie, but not in his hands ... is suddenly attacked, [and] the gun falls out of his
pocket and he's shot," Mr. Toluse testified, "That's not anything that I cover in my
class." (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2132, Ls.4-15.) Mr. Toluse did testify about the "21-foot rule."
(Tr., Vol. 2, p.2118, L.12-p.2119, L.4.) But, as even Hall's trial counsel recognized
below, to the extent that testimony was something the jury could rely on to
determine whether Hall's fear, if it existed, was objectively reasonable, the testimony
actually supported a finding of objective reasonableness under the facts of this
case. (Compare Tr., Vol. 2, p.2131, L.15 - p.2132, L.3 (counsel eliciting testimony
from Mr. Toluse that if "an aggressor is within 2 or 3 feet of the person with a
firearm," the aggressor could "cover that ground" in "[s]plit seconds") with Tr., Vol. 2,
p.1552, L.5 - p.1554, L.5 (state's expert testifying Emmett was shot from a distance
of two to three feet away).)

Reviewing Mr. Toluse's testimony as a whole, there

simply is no reasonable possibility that it prejudiced Hall with respect to the jury's
determination of whether Hall had an objectively reasonable fear.
Nor is there any reasonable possibility that "Mr. Toluse's testimony confused
the issues and misled the jury on the legal standards for self-defense and concealed
carry under Idaho law."

(Appellant's brief, p.52.)

The trial court specifically

instructed the jury that Mr. Toluse's testimony was being admitted for the limited
purpose of showing the "instruction he gave on the dates in question"; that, if
appropriate, the court would give the jury "detailed instructions" on "self-defense or
use of force" at the end of the tr,ial; and that the jury was not to consider Mr. Toluse's
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testimony other than for the limited purpose for which it was being admitted. (Tr.,
Vol. 2, p.2123, Ls.13-23.) Presuming, as this Court must, that the jury followed this
instruction, there is no possibility the jury regarded Mr. Toluse's testimony as setting
forth the legal standards for either concealed carry or self-defense. See State v.
Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345,369,313 P.3d 1, 25 (2013) Uurors are presumed to follow
court's instructions).

In addition, that the jury asked during deliberations for

"clarification regarding the concealed weapon law" (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2615, L.22 p.2616, L.3) actually demonstrates the jury did not regard Mr. Toluse's testimony as
setting forth any legal standards applicable to its decision in this case.
During deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the trial court:
"We would like clarification regarding the concealed weapon law.

Does the law

state how the weapon is to be carried when on a person, such as holstered versus
not holstered?" (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2615, L.22 - p.2616, L.3.) Hall argues that because
Mr. T oluse testified that he teaches a firearm should always be holstered, the jury's
question asking whether Idaho's concealed weapon law requires a concealed carry
weapon to be holstered is an indication Mr. Toluse's testimony confused the jurors
and misled them regarding "the legal standards for self-defense and concealed
carry under Idaho law." (Appellant's brief, pp.51-52.) The opposite is true. If the
jurors believed Mr. Toluse's testimony set forth the relevant legal standards for the
carrying of a concealed weapon, the jury would not have asked what the those legal
requirements are but would simply have concluded from Mr. Toluse's testimony that,
as a matter of law, a firearm should always be carried in a holster. That the jury did
not reach that conclusion and instead asked what is required under Idaho law is not
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surprising because the jury was specifically instructed it was not to consider Mr.
Toluse's testimony as law. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2123, Ls.10-23.) Nor is it an indication that
the jury was "confused or misled" by Mr. Toluse's testimony. Although the court's
final instructions included an instruction informing the jury that, under Idaho law, a
person may lawfully carry a deadly or dangerous weapon which is concealed on or
about his person ... if the person has a valid license to carry a concealed weapon"
(R., p.1516), there was no instruction informing the jury whether Idaho law requires

a concealed weapon to be carried in any specific manner. The jury's question on
this point merely indicated a gap in the court's instructions, not that the jury was
"confused or misled" by Mr. Toluse's testimony.
Finally, contrary to Hall's assertions, there is no indication in the record that
the jury believed, based on Mr. Toluse's testimony, that the law required Hall to
retreat before engaging in self-defense. (See Appellant's brief, p.52.) Mr. Toluse
did testify that he teaches the students in his concealed carry class to do everything
they can to avoid having to use self-defense, including fleeing from a potential
confrontation. (Tr., Vol. 2, p.2126, L.3 - p.2127, L.7.) As noted above, however,
the jury was specifically instructed it was not to consider Mr. Toluse's testimony as
setting forth any legal standard. In addition, the court also specifically instructed the
jury that, under Idaho law, "one need not retreat" before being justified in using selfdefense and that "[t]his law applies even though the person being attacked might
more easily have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene." (R.,
p.1522.) While the jury may have considered the fact that Hall waited for Emmett in
the Walgreens parking lot instead of retreating as evidence of malice, given the
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court's instructions, there simply is no reasonable possibility the jury believed Idaho
law required Hall to retreat in order to successfully claim self-defense.
In light of the foregoing, and considering the strength of the state's evidence,
this Court can confidently declare beyond a reasonable doubt that any error in the
admission of Mr. Toluse' testimony was harmless and did not affect Hall's
substantial rights.

V.

Hall Has Failed To Establish Any Error, Much Less Cumulative Error, Necessitating
Reversal Of His Conviction
Hall argues that, even if each of the instances of alleged error did not amount
individually to reversible error, "the district court's errors in his trial amounted to
actual errors depriving him of a fair trial." (Appellant's brief, p.53.) Hall's argument
fails because he has failed to show any error at all, much less that the cumulative
effect of the alleged errors deprived him of a fair trial.
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of trial errors, harmless in
themselves, may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial.

State v.

Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to
application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding of more than one error. State
v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1998).

The cumulative error

analysis does not include errors neither objected to nor found fundamental. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 230, 245 P.3d 961, 982 (2010).

Because Hall cannot show any

error, much less multiple objected-to errors, the cumulative error doctrine does not
apply.
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CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered
upon the jury verdict finding Hall guilty of second degree murder and of using a
firearm in the commission of the offense.
DATED this 5th day of March 2015.
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Appendix A

INSTRUCTION NO. - - (ICJI 1514)
The defendant contends, as a defense in this case to the above crimes, that the killing
was justifiable because the defendant was resisting an attempt to do great bodily harm, was
defending himself against a design to do great bodily harm, and/or was defending himself when
reasonable grounds existed to apprehend a design to do great bodily harm.
Under the law, homicide is justifiable if in any one of the following three (3)
circumstances.

I.
The homicide was committed while resisting an attempt to do great bodily injury
upon any person, including the defendant.

II.
The homicide was committed in defense of a person, including the defendant,
against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by violence or surprise, to
commit a felony. The circumstances must be sufficient to create a fear in a
reasonable person and the defendant must have acted under the influence of
such fears alone. However, the bare fear of such acts is z:wt sufficient unless the
circumstances are sufficient to create such a fear in a reasonable person and the
defendant acted 1:1:nder the influence of such fears alone.
Aggravated assault is a felony that consists of the following elements in this
case:

1. On or about March 11, 2011,
2. in the state of Idaho,
3. Emmett Corrigan committed an assault upon Robert Hall, by either

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -- 9

001237

•

a) intentionally and unlawfully threatening by word or act to
do violence to Robert Hall, with an apparent ability to do so,
and by doing some act which created a well-founded fear in
Robert Hall that such violence is imminent, or
b) attempting, with apparent ability, to commit a violent injury
on Robert Hall; and
5. Emmett Corrigan committed that assault with a deadly weapon or
instrument or by any means or force likely to produce great bodily
harm.

III.
The homicide was committed in the lawful defense of the defendant when there is

are reasonable grounds to apprehend a design to do some great bodily injury and
imminent danger of such design being accomplished. The circumstances must

be sufficient to create a fear in a reasonable person and the defend ant must
have acted under the influence of such fears alone. However, the bare fear of
such acts is not sufficient unless the circumstances are sufficient to create such a
fear in a reasonable person and the defendant acted under the influence of such
fears alone.

If the homicide appears to be justifiable, the defendant must, upon his trial, be fully
acquitted and discharged. The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide
was justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty.

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -- 10
001238

Appendix 8

INSTRUCTION NO. 33
A homicide is justifiable if the defendant was acting in self-defense.
In order to find that the defendant acted in self-defense, all of the following conditions
must be found to have been in existence at the time of the killing:
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in imminent danger
of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that the action the
defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the danger presented.
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable person, under
similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant was in imminent danger
of death or great bodily injury and believed that the action taken was necessary.
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger and not for
some other motivation.
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of
self-defense ends.
In deciding upon the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs, you should
determine what an ordinary and reasonable person might have concluded from all the
facts and circumstances which the evidence shows existed at that time, and not with
the benefit of hindsight.
The danger must have been present and imminent, or must have so appeared to
a reasonable person under the circumstances. A bare fear of death or great bodily
injury is not sufficient to justify a homicide. The defendant must have acted under the
influence of fears that only a reasonable person would have had in a similar position.
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The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
homicide was not justifiable. If there is a reasonable doubt whether the homicide was
justifiable, you must find the defendant not guilty.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 34
The kind and degree of force which a person may lawfully use in self-defense
are limited by what a reasonable person in the same situation as such person, seeing
what that person sees and knowi11g what the person knows, then would believe to be
necessary. Any use of force beyond that is regarded by the law as excessive. Although
a person may believe that the person is acting, and may act, in self-defense, the person
is not justified in using a degree of force clearly in excess of that apparently and
reasonably necessary under the existing facts and circumstances.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 35
In the exercise of the right of self-defense, one need not retreat. One may stand
one's ground and defend oneself by the use of all force and means which would appear
to be necessary to a reasonable person in a similar situation and with similar
knowledge. This law applies even though the person being attacked might more easily
have gained safety by flight or by withdrawing from the scene.
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